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GUTTING PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS: 




In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,1 public-sector unions 
face a constitutional challenge that could lead to their demise. In California, 
all public school employees are represented by a union—whether or not 
they are union members—and are required to pay an agency fee. This 
requirement seems to run contrary to the First Amendment, which generally 
prohibits the government from compelling citizens to support the speech 
and expressive activities of a private organization. However, in the 1977 
case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court found constitutional a 
statute that allowed unions to compel dissenting non-union members to pay 
agency fees.2 Specifically, the Court held statutes that forced public 
employees to pay agency fees did not violate the First Amendment as long 
as the agency fees were germane to a union’s bargaining expense and were 
unrelated to a union’s political activity.3 
In Friedrichs, the Court is being urged to overrule Abood and find that 
under the First Amendment, public employees who decline to join a union 
cannot be required to pay union agency fees.4 The Court’s ruling in 
Friedrichs could have a broad impact on public-sector unions’ financial 
health and political clout, as well as politics more broadly.5 This 
commentary will discuss the factual and legal background leading up to 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n., 2016 WL 1191684 (2015).
2. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (noting agency fees must be
collected for a purpose related to a union’s duty as the collective-bargaining representative). 
3. Id. at 235–36.
4. Brief for Petitioners at 16, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No.14-915 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
5. Amy Howe, Justices return to dispute over union fees for non-members: In Plain English,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:46 AM), htpp://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/justices-return-to-
dispute-over-union-fees-for-non-members-in-plain-english/. 
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Friedrichs, analyze each party’s argument and discuss why the Court 
should decline to overturn Abood. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Factual Background 
The petitioners in this case are led by Rebecca Friedrichs, who, along 
with nine other California public school teachers, objects to being required 
to pay an agency fee to a union as a nonmember.6 Respondents include the 
local unions, the National Education Association, and the California 
Teachers Association. The National Education Association is the nation’s 
largest professional union, and is “committed to advancing the cause of 
public education.”7 The California Teacher’s Association represents 
325,000 public educators in California and is the largest affiliate of the 
National Educators Association.8 In addition, California Attorney General 
Kamala Harris intervened in the district court proceeding, was an 
intervenor in the court of appeals, and is consequently a party to the 
proceeding.9 
Friedrichs and the nine other school teachers work in school districts 
that recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining agent for its 
employees.10 These districts and the respective unions have entered into 
several agreements that establish the terms and conditions of employment 
for Friedrichs and other public employees.11 One of these conditions for 
employment requires Friedrichs and other public school teachers to either 
join a union or allow agency fees to be deducted from their paycheck.12 
Because Friedrichs is not a member of a union, she must pay the union an 
agency fee.13 The total amount Friedrichs must pay is determined by the 
local unions and may be comprised of both chargeable and nonchargeable 
expenses.14 A “chargeable” expense is defined as a fee collected for 
purposes germane to the union’s “function as the exclusive bargaining 
representative.”15 The union has the duty of establishing which expenses 
	  
 6.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at ii. 
 7.  NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 8.  CAL. TEACHERS ASSOC., https://www.cta.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 9.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at iii. 
 10.  Id. at 5–6. 
 11.  Id. at 6–7. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Brief for Union Respondents at 9, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No.14-915 (U.S. Nov. 6, 
2015) [hereinafter Brief for Union Respondents]. 
 15.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3456(a) (West 2011). 
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are nonchargeable.16 Under state law, nonmembers must be allowed to 
object, or “opt-out,” of paying the nonchargeable expenses—which all 
petitioners do—and be charged a reduced agency fee comprised 
exclusively of chargeable expenses.17 
After determining the annual agency fee, the unions inform all the 
school districts that are under agency-shop agreements of the amount due.18 
The school districts then automatically deduct from the teachers’ paychecks 
the amount due in pro rata shares.19 These deductions are directly sent to 
the local unions and the California Teachers Association.20 
Agency fees for nonmembers are typically around two percent of a 
teacher’s total salary, equating to around $1,000 a year.21  Individuals who 
opt-out of paying the nonchargeable expenditures typically pay a reduced 
fee of $600 to $650 annually.22 
B.  Procedural History 
From the beginning, this case seemed destined for the Supreme Court. 
On April 30, 2013, Friedrichs filed suit in federal district court, challenging 
the Respondents’ agency-shop requirements. There, Friedrichs conceded 
her case was controlled by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and moved 
for judgment on the pleadings against her.23 The Respondents opposed 
Friedrichs’s motion and sought discovery to develop an evidentiary record 
related to Friedrichs’s claims. The district court rejected Respondents’ 
motion and granted Friedrichs’s motion for judgment against herself.24 
Friedrichs then appealed the district court’s judgment to the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.25 Again, she conceded that Abood foreclosed 
her Constitutional claim and moved for judgment against herself.26 
Respondents opposed this motion, arguing that the Ninth Circuit should 
conduct oral arguments and issue a published opinion.27 The Ninth Circuit 
	  
 16.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 4, 8. 
 17.  Id.; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (stating that activities 
not germane to a union’s duty as a collective bargaining agent may be financed by members and 
nonmembers who do not object to those expenditures). 
 18.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 6. 
 19.  Id. at 6–7. 
 20.  Id. at 7. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Brief for Union Respondents, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
 24.  Id. at 11. 
 25.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 8. 
 26.  Id. at 8–9. 
 27.  Id. at 9. 
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declined this request and instead summarily affirmed the district court.28 
Friedrichs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which granted her 
writ of certiorari on June 30, 2015.29 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Exclusive Bargaining and Agency-Shop Agreements 
Under California law, a union can become the exclusive bargaining 
representative for public school employees in a bargaining unit after 
demonstrating “proof of majority support.”30 After a union demonstrates 
sufficient support,31 the union becomes the sole representative of all the 
public school employees within the bargaining unit for purposes of 
bargaining over “wages, hours of employment, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.”32 A union’s exclusive representative status 
prohibits school districts from bargaining over terms and conditions of 
employment with individual employees, or with any other labor 
organization.33 Additionally, a union must represent every employee in its 
bargaining unit,34 including employees who are not actual members of the 
union.35 
To discourage employees from “free-riding”—refusing to contribute to 
the union, yet retaining the benefits of union representation—California 
law enables school districts to enter into agency-shop36 agreements with a 
union.37 This agreement empowers school districts to require that all 
	  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Freidrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015) (granting certiorari). 
 30.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3544(a) (West 2011). 
 31.  The specific and detailed requirements for a union to become officially recognized and 
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for a group of public employees are not relevant for 
this commentary. 
 32.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3543.2(a)(1) (West 2011); see generally Brief for the Attorney General 
of Cal., Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 14-915 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that by law, the 
scope of collective bargaining is limited to terms and conditions of employment). 
 33. See, e.g., Benjamin Wyle, Labor Arbitration and the Concept of Exclusive Representation, 7 
B.C. L. REV. 783 (1966). 
 34.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3546(a). 
 35.  See Steele v. Louisville & R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 194 (1944) (“So long as a labor union 
assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty . . . 
[and it must] represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, 
fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”). 
 36.  Also known as a “union shop” agreement. 
 37.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977) (noting an agency-shop 
agreement fairly distributes a union’s cost from collective bargaining and “counteracts the incentive that 
employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’”). 
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employees join the union or pay an agency fee,38 as a condition of 
employment.39 Under an agency-shop agreement, employers are mandated 
to deduct from the nonmember’s salary an agency fee that ideally 
represents that employee’s fair share of the union’s chargeable and 
nonchargeable activities.40 
B.  First Amendment Implications of Agency-Shop Agreements 
The First Amendment protects individuals’ freedom of speech,41 their 
freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, and their freedom to 
refrain from doing so.42 Absent safeguards, agency-shop agreements have 
the ability to violate nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.43 
In Abood, the Court recognized that forcing employees to contribute to 
a union impacts their First Amendment rights because certain employees 
may have a number of ideological objections to union activity.44 For 
example, “[o]ne individual might disagree with a union policy of 
negotiating limits on the right to strike . . . or might have economic or 
political objections to the unionism itself.”45 However, the Court also 
recognized that the union’s duty to bargain collectively on behalf of all 
employees46 “carries with it great responsibilities” and comes at a 
substantial cost.47 The Abood Court found a compromise, and held the First 
Amendment prohibits compelling nonmembers to pay agency fees that are 
not collected for purposes germane to a union’s role as the “exclusive 
bargaining representative.”48 
In the subsequent case Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association,49 the 
Court established that state statutes that enable unions to collect from 
dissenters agency fees that are germane to their role as a bargaining agent 
are justified because they serve the government’s “vital policy interest in 
labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders.’”50 
	  
 38.  Also known as a “fair share service fee.” 
 39.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 2. 
 40.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3546(a) (West 2011). 
 41.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 42.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 222. 
 43.  See id. at 234 (noting that because petitioners are being “compelled to make, rather than 
prohibited from making” contributions, it is “no less an infringement of their constitutional rights”). 
 44.  Id. at 222. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See id. at 221 (noting the union is required to represent all employees, “union and nonunion”). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 235–36. 
 49.  500 U.S. 507 (1991). 
 50.  Id. at 522. 
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C.  The Legal Context Leading up to Friedrichs 
Although Abood remains a controlling decision—and has been since 
1977—two recent Court decisions hinted that Abood may be in jeopardy.51 
In Knox v. SEIU Local 1000,52 Justice Alito and the majority questioned the 
constitutionality of agency-shop agreements.53 They stated that “acceptance 
of the free-rider argument as a justification for compelling nonmembers” to 
pay an agency fee is “something of an anomaly.”54 In other words, 
compelled agency fees burden non-members’ First Amendment rights, and 
that burden might not be outweighed by a State’s interest in preventing 
free-riding. 
Perhaps sensing the Court’s trepidation towards upholding the 
constitutionality of agency-shop agreements, non-union workers in Harris 
v. Quinn55 seized the moment and asked the Court to overturn Abood. 
Justice Alito again wrote the Court’s opinion, which held that Abood did 
not apply to the facts in Harris, and consequently refused to overrule it.56 
Nevertheless, Justice Alito and the majority wrote four pages highlighting 
what they deemed problematic with Abood, arguing it is a “bedrock 
principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person in 
this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he 
or she does not wish to support.”57 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Should the Court Overrule Abood? 
1.  Friedrichs’s Argument 
Friedrichs’s first argument is very simple: the underlying compromise 
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education—allowing unions to collect agency 
fees from nonmembers for the purpose of collective bargaining but 
prohibiting charges for political activities—is constitutionally indefensible. 
	  
 51.  Lyle Denniston, New Challenge to Public Employee Unions, Made Simple, SCOTUSBLOG, 
(August 24, 2015, 12:08 am), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/new-challenge-to-public-employee-
unions-made-simple/. 
 52.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 53.  See id. at 2282. 
 54.  Id. at 2290. 
 55.  134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 56.  See id. at 2638 (finding that agency-shop agreements are not chargeable to employees who 
were not exclusively employed by the state); see also id. at 2641 (noting the rationales supporting fair 
share agreements did not apply when the union’s bargaining was limited to those terms and conditions 
of employment controlled by the state). 
 57.  Id. at 2644. 
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She contends Abood is unsustainable because, due to the broad fiscal 
impact of union bargaining, everything that a public-sector union does is 
political in nature.58  Thus, it follows that any compelled agency fee 
violates a nonmember’s First Amendment right not to pay for political 
activities to which they object because whenever a union bargains with the 
government, it is a “quintessentially political act.”59 
Friedrichs also contends the Court should overrule Abood because it is 
a “jurisprudential outlier”60 and “irreconcilable with [the Supreme] Court’s 
decision in every related First Amendment context.”61 She states that the 
Court has recently held that the freedom to speak, or refrain from speaking, 
triggers exacting review, regardless of “whether the government is 
regulating its citizenry at large or requiring its employees to support and 
affiliate with particular political entities.”62 Therefore, it is “clear that 
exacting scrutiny applies where, as here, a state compels its public-school 
teachers” to pay agency fees.63 
Friedrichs further argues the “compelling interests” proffered in Abood 
and Lehnert to support compelled subsidization of collective bargaining—
promoting labor peace and preventing free-riding—do not withstand the 
required scrutiny.64 First, citing Abood, Friedrichs defines the government’s 
interest in labor peace as preventing the potential confusion and conflict 
that could arise if rival labor unions with different views sought to bargain 
with an employer.65 She reasons that this argument only supports a union’s 
right to exclusive representation, not its right to compel employees to pay 
union agency fees.66 Friedrichs also asserts that the government’s interest in 
labor peace is only implicated if Respondents can demonstrate agency fees 
are essential to a union’s survival. Because public-sector unions are 
“flourishing” in right-to-work states, the government’s interest in labor 
peace does not withstand scrutiny.67 
Second, Friedrichs rejects the government’s interest in compelling 
agency fees as a means to prevent free-riding. She again contends that 
	  
 58.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 14-915 (U.S. Nov. 
6, 2015) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari]. 
 59.  Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 4, at 9. 
 60.  Id. at 2. 
 61.  Id. at 1. 
 62.  Id. at 10. 
 63.  Id. at 10–11. 
 64.  Id. at 12. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
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preventing the compulsion of agency fees will not bankrupt unions, and 
thus the government’s interest in “preventing ‘free-riding’” does not 
withstand exacting scrutiny.68 Additionally, Friedrichs argues those 
employees that reject their union’s policies obviously are not free-riding on 
the policies they reject.69 
2.  Respondents’ Argument 
The Respondents urge the Court to uphold Abood because it “correctly 
reflects”70 the principle that a state’s interest in managing its workforce 
justifies infringing an employee’s First Amendment interests through 
imposed agency-fees.71 The Respondents first argue that Friedrichs 
incorrectly challenged agency fees on the theory that it cannot survive 
exacting scrutiny. As reflected in Abood, the Court recognizes that First 
Amendment analysis differs depending on whether the government is 
acting as an employer or regulator.72 Respondents point to Pickering v. 
Board of Education, and note that the Court previously held that if “the 
employee is not speaking ‘as a citizen’ and ‘on a matter of public concern,’ 
‘the employee has no First Amendment cause of action.’”73 Accordingly, 
the Respondents claim compelled agency fees collected for the purpose of 
collective bargaining are constitutionally justified, as they are a form of 
employee speech that is not a matter of public concern.74 Respondents 
claim this distinction between the government acting as an employer and a 
regulator is critical to prevent public employees’ speech from “interfer[ing] 
with the efficient and effective operation of government.”75 
Second, Respondents point out public employees’ First Amendment 
interests against compelled agency fees are “certainly not stronger than the 
interest in affirmative expression.”76 On the contrary, Respondents claim 
mandatory fees are actually less restrictive of First Amendment interests 
because they retain the public employees’ right to express themselves as 
	  
 68.  Id. at 13. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Brief for Union Respondents, supra note 14, at 11. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. at 19 (noting that “the Government has a much freer hand in dealing ‘with citizen 
employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large’”). 
 73.  Id. at 20. 
 74.   See id. at 25 (“Collective bargaining . . .  [is] employee speech because [it] fall[s] within the 
State’s internal personnel administration process for dealing with employment terms and conditions and 
thus fall[s] squarely within the State’s prerogative to manage its workplace.”). 
 75.  Id. at 20. 
 76.  Id. at 24. 
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citizens.77 
Third, Respondents contend that even if there were reasons to question 
Abood, the Court should at the minimum reaffirm the case based on stare 
decisis.78 Respondents point out that “strong reliance interests have 
developed around the agency-shop model,” and note outlawing agency-
shop agreements would overrule the “judgments of 23 States plus the 
District of Columbia.”79 Further, they claim that if the Court were to outlaw 
agency-shop agreements, tens of thousands of collective-bargaining 
agreements governing public employees would be thrown into disarray.80 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
It is likely that the Court will rule in favor of the California Teachers 
Association and the other respondents, and reaffirm the constitutionality of 
agency-shop agreements. First, if the Court overturns Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education and holds that compelling non-members to pay agency 
fees violates the First Amendment, the Court will contradict its precedent 
regarding employee speech, and may limit the First Amendment rights of 
unions and paying members.81 Second, even if the Court finds Friedrichs’s 
argument convincing, the Court will likely find Friedrichs failed to show 
special justification to overcome the doctrine of stare decisis. 
A.  The First Amendment Rights of Public Employees and the Right of the 
Government to Maintain Control of Its Workforce 
Following Abood, the Court has consistently found the government 
“has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts . . . as employer.”82 
The principle remains true in cases in which the state is the proprietor in 
managing its workforce, and is not the direct employer.83 Of course, a 
citizen does not lose his First Amendment rights by becoming a public 
	  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 31. 
 79.  Id. at 12. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of 
Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 461–70 (2015). 
 82.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. 
High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1986) (“[T]he State has interests as an employer 
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection 
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”); see also Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t. of Agric., 
553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008) (“[G]overnment has significantly greater leeway in its dealing with citizen 
employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”). 
 83.  Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 148 (2011). 
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employee.84 However, a citizen’s First Amendment rights are circumscribed 
when he accepts public employment85 because his rights are balanced 
against the government’s “substantial interest” to act as an effective 
employer.86 Indeed, the Court has warned against constitutionalizing 
employee speech relating to terms of employment,87 noting the government 
has “broad authority” to supervise the conduct of public employees.88 
Similarly, Justice Kagan, in dissent in Harris v. Quinn, declared that 
“except in narrow circumstances [the Court will] not allow an employee to 
make a ‘federal constitutional issue’ out of basic ‘employment matters, 
including . . . pay, discipline, promotions, [and] leave.’”89 
Public employees lack First Amendment protection for speech that is 
related to their terms of employment.90 Collective bargaining—contrary to 
Friedrichs’s argument—merely involves speech-related terms of 
employment.91 Therefore, the Court should follow its precedent and find 
that requiring agency fees for the purposes of collective bargaining falls 
outside First Amendment protection. 
Even if the Court were to find agency fees implicate the First 
Amendment, they should still hold in favor of Respondents. The Court 
should hold that any limited burden on the First Amendment rights of 
dissenting non-members is outweighed by the government’s benefit of 
having effective and efficient management of its workforce.92 In other 
words, the Court should reaffirm the government’s “broad authority” to 
manage its workforce.93 If the Court were to rule in favor of Friedrichs, the 
decision would be—borrowing from Justice Alito—“something of an 
anomaly”94 and would overturn years of Court precedent regarding public-
employee speech claims. 
If the Court holds that statutes that enable unions to require agency fees 
	  
 84.  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 85.  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
 86.  See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011) (“The government has 
a substantial interest in ensuring that all of its operations are efficient and effective.”). 
 87.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
 88.  Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 89.  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2655 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2496). 
 90.  Benjamin Sachs, Harris v. Quinn: The Context of First Amendment Claims, ON LABOR (Jan. 
20, 2014), http://onlabor.org/2014/01/20/harris-v-quinn-the-context-of-first-amendment-claims/. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Ann Hodges, Symposium: Public-sector Unions, Labor Relations, and Free Speech, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (August 25, 2015 10:15 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/08/symposium-public-
sector-unions-labor-relations-and-free-speech/. 
 93.  Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2494. 
 94.  Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012). 
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from dissenting nonmembers is compelled speech, then forcing union 
members to pay to support these members is also compelled speech.95 
Accordingly, a ruling in favor of Friedrichs violates the First Amendment 
rights of unions and its members by requiring them to subsidize the speech 
of nonpayers.96 Plus, in theory, unions and their members have their 
resources that they can spend on political activities limited by free-riders, 
which further infringes their First Amendment rights.97 Put simply, if the 
Court were to overrule Abood and hold that forcing dissenting non-
members to pay agency fees is a violation of their First Amendment rights, 
the Court would in effect violate the First Amendment rights of unions and 
its paying members.98 Therefore, the Court reaffirming Abood’s 
requirement that fees can only be collected for purposes of collective 
bargaining would represent a reasonable compromise in a situation “with 
conflicting First Amendment rights at stake.”99 
B.  The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
Even if the Court finds that Friedrichs’s argument is stronger, the 
“Court has always held that ‘any departure’ from precedent ‘demands 
special justification.’”100 Abood’s principles have become embedded in the 
law, as well as public-sector employment relationships.101 Until very 
recently, the Court has re-affirmed and cited favorably Abood’s principle 
that distinguishes agency fees collected for the cost of collective bargaining 
and those of political activity.102 Further, more than twenty states have 
statutes that explicitly authorize agency-shop agreements, which has 
resulted in thousands of multi-year contracts between state governments 
and public-sector unions.103 The Court has previously held that stare decisis 
is of increased importance when overturning precedent would require 
States to amend their statutes and affect contracts.104 
	  
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  ANN C. HODGES, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW & POL’Y, FRIEDRICHS V. CALIFORNIA 
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION: THE AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS SYSTEM IN JEOPARDY 11 (Nov. 12, 2015). 
 100.  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct 2618, 2651 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. 
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
 101.  Id. at 2651–52. 
 102.  See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 213–14 (2009); Lehnert v. Ferris Facult. Ass’n., 500 
U.S. 507, 519 (1991); Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455–57 (1984); see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 
2652 (pointing out the Court had not indicated it had any problem with Abood until  Knox in 2012). 
 103.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2652. 
 104.  Id. at 2652. 
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The Friedrichs’s primary argument is that Abood is self-contradictory, 
and thus unworkable, and violates the First Amendment rights of dissenting 
nonmembers because all public sector collective bargaining is inherently 
political.105 The petitioners in Abood made the same arguments, but the 
Abood Court rejected them.  The Court noted, 
There can be no quarrel with the truism that because public employee 
unions attempt to influence governmental policymaking, their activities 
and the views of members who disagree with them may be properly 
deemed political. But that characterization does not raise the ideas and 
beliefs of public employees onto a higher plane than the ideas and 
beliefs of private employees.106 
Abood recognized the political character of public-sector bargaining, 
yet held agency-shop agreements do not violate the First Amendment rights 
of dissenting nonmembers.107 Although the petitioners in this case have 
changed, their arguments remain the same as those that were rejected by 
the court in Abood.108 Here, Friedrichs merely rehashes old arguments and 
catalogs alleged errors committed in Abood, which is not sufficient to 
overcome the doctrine of stare decisis.109 
Friedrichs argues that “the right of the citizen not to be subjected to 
unconstitutional treatment outweighs any reliance or predictability interests 
of stare decisis.”110 Essentially, special justification is not needed if it 
involves denial of a constitutional right.111 However, if the Court begins 
simply overruling precedent, what happens to society’s view of the Court 
as legitimate and stable?112 Certainly, some cases should be overturned. 
Here, however, the Court should not overrule Abood—which has worked 
“reasonably well”113—because there is no “basic principle here that’s 
erroneous.”114 There is simply no special justification for the Court to 
overrule Abood. 
	  
 105.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 14. 
 106.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
 107.  See id. at 209 (finding agency-shop clauses are valid). 
 108.  HODGES, supra note 99, at 7. 
 109.  See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2652 (noting that “[t]he special justifications needed to reverse an 
opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point 
of stare decisis”). 
 110.  Howe, supra note 5. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No.14-915 (Jan. 11, 
2016). 
 113.  Id. at 29. 
 114.  Id. at 33. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which 
held constitutional state statutes that enable public-sector unions to require 
agency fees from dissenting nonmembers, should be left untouched. The 
Court cannot overturn Abood without violating its precedent regarding First 
Amendment restrictions on employee speech. Plus, a ruling in favor of 
Friedrichs may infringe on the First Amendment rights of unions and 
paying members.115 Finally, even if the Court finds merit in Friedrichs’s 
argument, it will not find the special justification needed to overcome the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Friedrichs’s attempt to escape paying agency fees 
should be rejected by this Court. 
 
	  
 115.  Fisk and Poueymirou, supra note 81, at 461–70. 
